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LEGISLATION
There were no legislative provisions of note pertinent to the law




The Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the withdrawal of an
admission in civil proceedings in Saayman v Road Accident Fund
2011 (1) SA 106 (SCA). The court (para [12]) held that a
concession made during the course of counsel’s address did not
amount to a formal admission. Consequently, it was not neces-
sary for an application for a formal withdrawal of the statement to
be made. It was possible for the concession be withdrawn at
any time during the trial in the absence of prejudice to the
opposing party.
Heher JA (Leach JA and Majiedt AJA concurring), agreeing
with the majority judgment of Bosielo JA, gave a separate
judgment providing additional grounds and it is in this judgment
that the court expands on the characteristics of an admission. The
first hurdle to overcome in following this aspect of the judgment is
to determine whether the court views the arguments presented as
pertaining to informal or formal admissions. The court explicitly
characterizes the relevant statements as informal admissions as
they were not recorded as admissions by the court. In doing so
the judges refer to section 5 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence
Act 25 of 1965, which is somewhat confusing, as section 5 has
nothing to say on the matter. (This is perhaps due to the fact that
DT Zeffertt, AP Paizes and A St Q Skeen (The South African Law of
Evidence (2003) 784) mistakenly refer to section 5 when they
actually mean section 15.) It must be presumed that the court is
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referring to section 15 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act,
which provides: ‘It shall not be necessary for any party in any civil
proceedings to prove nor shall it be competent for any such party
to disprove any fact admitted on the record of such proceedings.’
As a formal admission may be express or implied, oral or in
writing, it becomes necessary to ascertain when a fact is admit-
ted on the record of proceedings. I have been unable to find any
authority for the view that the admission must be explicitly
entered onto the record as a formal admission by the presiding
officer. In the absence of such authority the recording require-
ment need not extend any further than that the admission be
made in court during trial proceedings and consequently form
part of the court record. However, there is authority for the view
that counsel’s address in opening or closing does not form part of
the court record (Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Bantu
Education 1966 (1) SA 229 (N) at 242–3; Kevin and Lasia
Property Investment CC v Roos NO 2004 (4) SA 103 (SCA) para
[12]).
Unfortunately, Saayman does not provide clarity here as the
judgment, despite declaring the statements in question informal
admissions, goes on to consider whether a formal withdrawal was
necessary. As informal admissions are items of evidence that can
be contradicted or explained away there is no necessity to
withdraw them. Formal admissions on the other hand must be
formally withdrawn in compliance with established rules.
Against this background the court (para [28]) identified the
following characteristics of a formal admission: (a) it is a state-
ment against interest; (b) which has the effect of binding the
maker; and (c) it must be made with intention (implied/explicit) for
removing ‘a fact that depends on proof from the field of conten-
tion’.
The court found that in the circumstances a statement against
interest made during counsel’s address did not constitute a
formal admission, did not have the effect of binding the maker
and consequently there was no necessity to apply for a formal
withdrawal. Another statement against interest made in counsel’s
heads of argument was not grounded in fact and therefore
constituted no more than the opinion of counsel. Furthermore, the
concession made by counsel was not intended to be an admis-
sion of his client or to remove the particular fact from contention,
and consequently, this did not require a formal withdrawal.
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Admissions: criminal proceedings
Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 allows for
the making of a formal admission by the accused. Such an
admission will constitute ‘sufficient proof of such fact’. In S v Van
der Westhuizen 2011 (2) SACR 26 (SCA), the Supreme Court of
Appeal revisited the effect of such an admission and held that the
words ‘sufficient proof’ meant that no further evidence was
required to prove the fact admitted (see, for example, S v Seleke
1980 (3) SA 745 (A); S v Sesetse 1981 (3) SA 353 (A)). Cloete JA
drew a distinction between formal and informal admissions, and
held that an accused was not entitled to adduce evidence
inconsistent with his section 220 admissions, or to require the
State to adduce evidence on the facts formally admitted. An
accused who wishes to lead inconsistent evidence must first
persuade the court that he has a bona fide explanation as to why
the admission was made in the first place and why he now wishes
to withdraw it (para [37]). This approach reconciles the purpose
of section 220 (to avoid wasting valuable resources in proving
what is not in issue) and society’s interest in reducing the risk of a
wrong conviction.
The court in Van der Westhuizen noted that the provisions of
section 105A(10) of the Criminal Procedure Act, whilst rendering
admissions made in prior but unsuccessful plea negotiations
inadmissible, contained a proviso which allowed the accused to
waive this protection and ‘agree to the recording of the admis-
sions’ (para [16]).
Confessions
The relevant facts in S v Mkhize 2011 (1) SACR 554 (KZD) can
be cursorily summarized as follows: the accused was arrested on
27 August 2009 in respect of two murder charges. He was
interviewed and a statement taken from him for the first time on
3 November 2009, and he made a confession to a commissioned
police officer on 5 November 2009. The accused was brought to
court for the first time on 6 November 2009. The court found that
there had been a blatant disregard for the accused’s constitu-
tional right to be brought before court within 48 hours. Referring
to S v Viljoen 2011 (1) SACR 554 (KZD), but not directly to section
35(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the
court held that evidence obtained unconstitutionally could not be
admitted into evidence. This categorical statement overlooks the
necessity of establishing a link between the constitutional breach
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and the procurement of the evidence and does not address a
significant body of case law, in terms of which it is clear that
a constitutional breach does not automatically lead to the conclu-
sion that the accused’s right to a fair trial has been infringed, or
that the admission of evidence will be detrimental to the adminis-
tration of justice. This lacuna in the court’s exposition of the law
may well be due to the fact that in the circumstances of the case it
would have made little difference to the outcome. The court in any
event took the precaution of finding that the state had not
discharged the onus of proving that the confession was made
freely and voluntary and without undue influence. It did so, on the
basis of the strength of accumulative inferences to be drawn from
the proven facts. Two of these facts were singled out for particular
emphasis — the failure to bring the accused to court within the
specified time limits set by the Constitution and the Criminal
Procedure Act, and the absence of any substantial evidence,
other than the confession, on which to base a conviction.
Although the reasoning of the court is not always explicitly
recorded, there can be no doubt that the South African Police
Service would do well to absorb its message.
APPEAL
In S v Leve 2011 (1) SACR 87 (ECG), Jones J reiterated the
fundamental rule that a court of appeal should not ‘depart from
the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility, unless they are
vitiated by irregularity, or unless an examination of the record of
evidence reveals that those findings are patently wrong’ (para
[8]). This principle, the court held (para [90]), applied equally to
the trial court’s application of a cautionary rule.
In Minister of Safety and Security v Craig 2011 (1) SACR 469
(SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal drew a distinction between
findings of credibility based on demeanour and those arising as a
result of inferences drawn from the facts. In the latter instance, an
appeal court would not be so reluctant to interfere with the trial
court’s finding of credibility, particularly where the credibility
findings are not borne out by the record. The court noted that ‘a
court of appeal, with the benefit of the full record, may often be in
a better position to draw inferences’ (para [58]).
In S v Ncube 2011 (2) SACR 471 (GSJ), the court permitted
evidence on appeal in order to complete the reconstruction of an
incomplete record. Lamont J, noting both Constitutional Court
(S v Lawrence 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC)) and Supreme Court of
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Appeal (Colman v Dunbar 1933 AD 141) authority for the general
rule that evidence on appeal would be allowed only in excep-
tional circumstances, held that the relevant criteria were present
in the matter before him. These included the need for finality,
the need to avoid prejudice, the materiality and weight of the
evidence and a sufficient explanation for the need to lead
evidence on appeal. The new evidence also did not include a
material dispute of fact.
The court’s reasoning on this aspect of the judgment provides
a useful summary of the existing law (at 472–6).
CAUTIONARY RULES
Children
The cautionary rule applicable to children was significant to the
appeal heard in S v Hanekom 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC). Saner
AJ upheld the appeal and overturned the conviction of indecent
assault on the basis that the court a quo erred in not paying
sufficient attention to the cautionary rule in finding that the
accused’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
There is nothing contentious about the judgment in that the court
cannot be faulted on its articulation or application of the law.
However, if one reads the judgment the recurring question arises
— is such a cautionary rule necessary at all? There were sufficient
indicators as to the potential unreliability of the complainant’s
testimony for the court to reach the same conclusion without the
application of the cautionary rule; for example, material inconsis-
tencies within the child’s testimony. The same doubt would have
arisen whether it was a child or adult. However, if more was
understood about the recall of children, the court may (or may
not) have concluded that the inconsistencies were not material
given the three year delay between occurrence and trial as well
as the child’s ignorance of adult sexuality. The discriminatory
effect of this cautionary rule, which is not necessarily supported
by social science evidence, has been raised and discussed in a
number of forums. Perhaps the time is ripe for a constitutional
challenge — perhaps like the cautionary rule applicable to
complainants in sexual offence cases it will be found to have no
rational basis.
However, the uncritical description of the cautionary rule
applicable to the child witness in S v Leve (2011 (1) SACR 87
(ECG) para [9]) indicates that it is unlikely that the courts in the
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near future are likely to develop the common law so as to accord
with social science research or developments in Anglo-American
jurisdictions which view this rule as archaic. Arguments as to the
constitutionality of this cautionary rule have been made else-
where (see PJ Schwikkard in Artz & Smythe Should We Consent?
(2008) 79).
Single witness
In S v Mahlangu 2011 (2) SACR 164 (SCA), dealing with a
challenge to the weight given to the evidence of a single witness
involved in a police trap, the appeal court held that the cautionary
rules did not require a presiding officer to expressly use specific
phrases (‘for example, ‘cautionary rule’, or ‘evidence of a trap’). It
was sufficient for a presiding officer to demonstrate in his
judgment that he was aware of the necessity of taking care in
his/her evaluation of the evidence. This is a pragmatic approach
which begs the question as to why in the absence of a jury the
cautionary rules are retained at all.
See also Identification below.
CHILDREN
Section 170A inquiry
In Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment 2011 (2) SACR 109 (GNP), Southwood J, after providing a
useful summary of DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC), in which
the constitutionality of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act
was considered, noted that the inquiry into whether an intermedi-
ary should be appointed was a narrow one. The inquiry was
restricted to whether it was in the best interests of a child for an
intermediary to be appointed to assist the child to testify. Section
170A was not intended to provide the opportunity for a trial-within-
a-trial to be held to determine the competence and credibility of
the child witness (para [7]).
In camera hearing
In Media 24 v NPA 2011 (2) SACR 321 (GNP), Raulinga J came
to a pragmatic compromise in balancing the constitutional right of
freedom of expression and the constitutional rights of the child in
applying section 63(5) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. Section
63(5) reads: ‘No person may be present at any sitting of a child
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justice court, unless his or her presence is necessary in connec-
tion with the proceedings of the child justice court or the
presiding officer has granted him or her permission to be
present.’
One of the accused in the trial dealing with the murder of
Eugene Terre’blanche was a minor. Due to the considerable
public interest in the case, the press sought access to the
proceedings and applied for a limited number of journalists to be
present during the trial. The court held that section 63(5) clearly
granted the court a discretion to permit the presence of specified
persons during the trial of a minor. It held that section 63(5)
constituted an exception to the requirement that trials be held in
open court. Although it is not clear that the court drew a
distinction between ‘what is interesting to the public’ and ‘the
public interest’ (para [16]), it fashioned an order that could
accommodate a wide range of interests — a restricted number of
journalists and four members of the Terre’blanche family would
be permitted to view the trial by means of closed circuit television,
and the identity of the minor would be protected through blurring
of the image (or some other means.) In this way the child was
protected from having his identity revealed and from the potential
stress and intimidation he might have felt having the media
and/or public present in the court room. At the same time, the
public’s right to access to information and interest in open court
proceedings was minimally restricted.
Evidence on sentencing
The importance of leading evidence in order for a court to
properly balance the interests of children with other societal
interests when sentencing a mother was emphasized in S v Pillay
2011 (2) SACR 409 (SCA). The court found that there had been
insufficient evidence before the court a quo when it had sen-
tenced the accused, a mother of six children. It consequently set
the sentence aside and remitted the matter to the trial court to
impose sentence afresh. Seriti JA emphasized the proactive role
that needs to be played by the State, presiding officers and legal
representatives. The court did not rule out the possibility of a
sentence of incarceration for parents whose children would be at
risk — it simply emphasized the importance of a court having
sufficient evidence before it in order to balance all (and some-
times competing) interests (see MS v S (Centre for Child Law as
Amicus Curiae) 2011 (2) SACR 88 (CC); S v M (Centre for Child
Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC)).
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For a further discussion of evidence provisions affecting chil-
dren, see ‘Cautionary Rules’ above.
DISCHARGE
Although the decision to refuse discharge in terms of section
174 of the Criminal Procedure Act was no doubt factually sound
in S v Masondo; In Re S v Mthembu 2011 (2) SACR 286 (GSJ), the
judgment is rather surprising in its dismissal of constitutional
considerations such as equality, the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and the right to a fair trial. All of these have been applied
by the Supreme Court of Appeal (S v Lubaxa 2001 (2) SACR 703
(SCA); S v Legote 2001 (2) SACR 179 (SCA)) in determining the
appropriate scope of the discretion conferred by section 174 to
grant discharge at the close of the State case. Kgomo J’s
dismissal of constitutional considerations appears to rest on the
fact that after the close of the State case, if an accused is refused
discharge, he or she may simply close his or her own case
without testifying. This ignores the vagaries of legal representa-
tion and the court’s duty to uphold the constitutional right to a fair
trial.
The Supreme Court of Appeal has held that if there is no
evidence against the accused at the close of the state case, they
must be discharged (Legote (supra)). Whether this requires the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case, or evidence sufficient
to sustain a reasonable and probable belief in guilt, remains an
open question (Lubaxa (supra)). In Lubaxa, Nugent JA distin-
guished a single accused from a co-accused, and held that
where there is the possibility that a co-accused may incriminate
the applicant, then discharge may be refused despite the
absence of sufficient evidence against the applicant, and such
refusal would not constitute an infringement of constitutional
rights.
The uncertainties raised by Lubaxa were partially addressed
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Nkosi 2011 (2) SACR 482
(SCA). In Nkosi, it was common cause that in the court a quo the
state had failed to establish ‘any evidence against the first
appellant on which a reasonable man could convict him at the
end of the case’ (para [24]). (This wording would suggest that for
the State to avoid discharge it is required to establish a prima
facie case.) The court a quo refused to hear the application for
discharge on the basis that there were multiple accused, and that
accordingly such an application would be inappropriate. This,
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the appeal court held in Nkosi, was not a proper application of
Lubaxa which foresaw the possibility that in certain circum-
stances the failure to discharge a co-accused might amount to
the infringement of a right to a fair trial (paras [25] and [26]). It
concluded that the first appellant’s right to a fair trial had been
compromised through the court a quo’s refusal even to hear the
application for discharge, as there was no ‘ reasonable basis, for
an expectation that his co-accused might incriminate him’ (para
[26]). It is now clear that Lubaxa may not be evoked as a blanket
precedent for refusing discharge on the application of a co-
accused.
In S v Agliotti 2011 (2) SACR 437 (GSJ), the court reviewed the
post-constitutional development of section 174 jurisprudence
and, finding that the sole State witness incriminating Agliotti
lacked all credibility, discharged the accused. The court, refer-
ring to S v Mpetha 1983 (4) SA 262 (C), noted that in section 174
proceedings credibility played only a limited role and would
generally only be taken into consideration where ‘it was of such
poor quality that no reasonable person could possibly accept it’
(para [262]).
DISCOVERY
In PFE International v Industrial Development Corporation of SA
2011 (4) SA 24 (KZD), Motala AJ held that section 7 of the
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) did not
exclude the operation of the PAIA when it was invoked to facilitate
the production of or access to records required for civil litigation
where there was no rule of court that made provision for such
access. Consequently, the court held that the PAIA could be
invoked where the records required were in the possession of a
person who was a party to the civil proceedings and the records
in question were required prior to trial (such as for the purposes
of pleading).
In Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment 2011 (2) SACR 109 (GNP), the court held that the raw data
compiled by a third party in order to assist the state in assessing
whether it was in the child’s interest to testify through an
intermediary in terms of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure
Act did not form part of the police docket. The applicant
accordingly should have sought access to the documentation in
terms of the provisions of the PAIA.
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DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Part VI of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965
(CPEA) sets out the conditions in which documentary hearsay
evidence may be admitted. (Section 3 of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 provides an alternative route to
admissibility.) The construction of certain of the provisions of Part
VI was in issue in Muller v BOE Bank 2011 (1) SA 252 (WCC). The
documentary hearsay was a copy of an affidavit made for
different proceedings by a person (the deponent) who was
deceased by the time of the trial.
Binns-Ward J noted (para [24]) that a court must admit
evidence that meets the requirements of section 34(1) of the Act,
subject to the exclusionary provisions of section 34(3). Once the
evidence is admitted, the court will determine what weight, if any,
should be attached to the documentary hearsay evidence (s 35
of the CPEA).
It was common cause that the deponent had personal know-
ledge of the matters dealt with in his affidavit and that he was
deceased, thus filling two of the prerequisites for admission in
terms of section 34(1). However, subsection (1) also requires
submission of the original document subject to the provisions of
subsection (2)(b). Section 34(2)(b) permits a copy of the original
document to be produced if it is ‘proved to be a true copy’ and
not allowing its production would otherwise cause undue delay or
expense.
A stumbling block to admission was, of course, the absence of
the original, the pre-1961 English case of Bowskill v Dawson
[1954] 1 QB 288 suggesting that similarly but not identically
worded legislation required proof of the existence of the original.
Binns-Ward J noted that unlike the South African provision, the
English counterpart required the copy to be certified a true copy
(para [30]). The absence of this requirement meant that section
34(2)(b) fell to be interpreted differently in that it simply requires
proof that the copy is a true copy. The court held that the
applicable standard of proof was proof on a balance of probabili-
ties (at para [32]). It accepted that the original had been lost and
to continue looking for it would cause undue delay and expense.
The court found it unnecessary to decide what the position would
be if it was established that the original had been destroyed.
Nevertheless, the court suggested that the legislature might want
to consider ‘improving the South African statute along the lines of
the 1995 English Civil Evidence Act’ (para [34]).
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The court also departed from the reasoning of Devlin J in
Bowskill that required an interpretation that favoured the least
divergence from the common law. Binns-Ward J noted (para [36])
that section 34(1) was introduced precisely to allow a departure
from the common law, and that section 34(2)(b) constituted an
exception to section 34(1), not the common law. This approach
also accords with the reminder to the courts in section 35 that
they may attach as much weight as they deem fit, in the
circumstances to the hearsay evidence that has been admitted.
This flexibility, the court noted, facilitated the admission of
relevant evidence and enhanced the ability of a court to ‘justly
decide civil cases’ (para [36]).
The court’s purposive approach to interpretation is welcome in
an area in which practitioners and scholars frequently forget to
question the rationale underlying legislative amendment.
Section 34(3) provides that ‘[n]othing in this Act shall render
admissible as evidence any statement made by a person inter-
ested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated
involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend
to establish’. There is no clear definition of an interested person,
and whether or not a deponent falls into this category will be
determined on the facts of the case.
On the facts in Muller v BOE Bank, the court found that that the
affidavit had not been made when the present litigation was
contemplated by the deponent, that the deponent as an indepen-
dent consultant was unlikely to be biased, and that the narrative
of the affidavit did not show any bias. Furthermore, there was no
indication of the deponent having a pecuniary or proprietary
interest in the outcome. The affidavit was admitted into evidence
(paras [48] and [49]; see also Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd v Commis-




In considering whether the court a quo had properly dealt with
the evidence of an expert as regards photographic identification,
the court reiterated that the role of an expert was merely to assist the
court. It held that the court a quo had correctly evaluated the identi-
fication evidence in taking into account the expert testimony and its
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own observations of the features of the accused during the trial. The
court referred to and applied Michael v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty)
Ltd 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA).
HEARSAY
Data messages
The dictum of Malan J in LA Consortium & Vending v MTN
Service Provider 2011 (4) 577 (GSJ) is another contribution to the
slowly evolving jurisprudence on the appropriate interpretation of
section 15 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions
Act 25 of 2002. Section 15 reads:
‘(1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be
applied so as to deny the admissibility of a data message, in
evidence —
(a) on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message;
or
(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could
reasonably be expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is
not in its original form.
(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due
evidential weight.
(3) In accessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard
must be had to —
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was
generated, stored or communicated;
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data
message was maintained;
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and
(d) any other relevant factor.
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of
business, or a copy or printout of or an extract from such data
message certified to be correct by an officer in the service of such
person, is on its mere production in any civil, criminal, administra-
tive or disciplinary proceedings under any law, the rules of a self
regulatory organization or any other law or the common law,
admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable proof
of the facts contained in such record, copy, printout or extract.’
Although it is not entirely clear from the judgment, it appears
that the interpretation of subsection (4) should have been key to
the court’s reasoning, as the data messages in question were
made by persons during the ordinary course of business. The
reason it is unclear is that the judgment refers to a position taken
on section 15(4) by Schwikkard and Van der Merwe in the second
edition of Principles of Evidence (2002) (since then the evolving
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case law has led to the expression of a slightly different view in
the 2009 edition, see pages 414 et seq.) The court then contrasts
this with a contrary view taken on s 15(1) by Zeffertt, Paizes and
Skeen (The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 394). The
passage referred to by Zeffertt et al does not deal with section
15(4) at all and the court fails to explain the relationship between
subsections (1) and (4) of section 15.
If section 15(4) were not applicable, then the approach of the
court is consistent with that in Ndlovu v The Minister of Correc-
tional Services [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W) and S v Ndiki 2008 (2)
SACR 252 (Ck), in so far as these courts held that where the
information in a data message referred to in section 15(1)(a) is
dependent on the credibility of a natural person who is not called
as a witness, admissibility falls to be determined by the general
hearsay provisions contained in section 3 of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act of 1988. But as section 15(4) did apply in LA
Consortium & Vending v MTN Service Provider, the court’s
judgment is not consistent with the obiter statement in Ndlovu that
section 15(4) ‘provides an exception to the manner of proof and
evidential weight ordinarily to be accorded to a data message’ (at
172). Interpreting section 15(4) as a self-contained exception
would also be consistent with the approach of Zeffertt et al that
the admissibility of data messages which are hearsay will be
determined by statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule (at 213).
The most obvious statutory provision in this instance is section
15(4) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act. In
the absence of an explanation as to why section 15(4) should not
be viewed as an express exception to the hearsay rule, the
approach of the court in Ndlovu is to be preferred.
Documentary hearsay
The appeal of the infamous Reitz four against sentence was
heard by the High Court in S v Van der Merwe 2011 (2) SACR 509
(FB). In the course of making its remarkable finding that the video
showing the simulated initiation and humiliation of black workers
posing as black students did not show any racist motive (at 527),
the court dealt cursorily in an obiter dictum with the admissibility
of documentary hearsay. The appellants in mitigation of sentence
had submitted a media article as example of the public vilification
of the appellants. The state consented to its admission. The
presiding officer in the court a quo clearly found this article to
constitute an aggravating not mitigating factor. The appeal court
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held that this amounted to an unfairness as the appellants had
not been forewarned that it would be seen as an aggravating
factor and that courts should be wary of assuming that press
articles reflect the convictions of the community. It is no doubt
correct that courts should be very cautious before according
weight to press articles. However, are courts really required to
give notice to a party that they may draw a negative inference
from evidence that a party tenders in his or her favour? Although
not clear it appears that the evidence was tendered by the
appellants to prove that they had been vilified in the press, and it
is clear that the court accepted this contention of the appellants.
It was not used to prove a fact other than that which the
appellants intended; it was the inference drawn from that fact that
distinguished the approach of the appellants and the court a quo.
An appeal court may well find such an inference to be unsubstan-
tiated in the circumstances, but to require the court a quo to give
the appellants an opportunity to contradict their own averment
would seem to be pushing the boundaries of fairness at the
sentencing stage. Unlike in the cases referred to by the court,
the inference drawn by the court did not change the boundaries
of the dispute or shift the onus of proof (cf Administrator,
Transvaal v Theletsane 1991 (2) SA 192 (A)).
IDENTIFICATION
The Supreme Court of Appeal once again set out the appropri-
ate cautionary approach to be taken to eye-witness identification
evidence in S v Ngcamu (2011 (1) SACR 1 (SCA) para [10]). It
held that, on taking a holistic view of the evidence, there was no
doubt that the identification in question was accurate. In reaching
this conclusion the court cited the following passage from S v
Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A) at 768A–C:
‘Because of the fallibility of human observation, evidence of identifica-
tion is approached by the courts with some caution. It is not enough
for the identifying witness to be honest: the reliability of his observation
must also be tested. This depends on various factors, such as lighting,
visibility, and eyesight; the proximity of the witness; his opportunity for
observation, both as to time and situation; the extent of his prior
knowledge of the accused; the mobility of the scene; corroboration;
suggestibility; the accused’s face, voice, build, gait, and dress; the
result of identification parades, if any; and, of course, the evidence by
or on behalf of the accused. The list is not exhaustive. These factors,
or such of them as are applicable in a particular case, are not
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individually decisive, but must be weighed one against the other, in
the light of the totality of the evidence, and the probabilities.’
Dock identification is subject to additional caution, as it runs
the risk of been equated with a leading question. Nevertheless, in
S v Ramabokela 2011 (1) SACR 122 (GNP), the court clearly
stated that although dock identification must be treated with
caution, it may nevertheless be relevant and carry weight. This is
consistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in S v Mdlongwa 2010 (2) SACR 419 (SCA), which was
criticized in JQR 2010 (4) for attaching undue weight to dock
identification. Cases expressing scepticism about dock identifi-
cation include S v Moti 1998 (2) SACR 245 (SCA), S v Maradu
1994 (2) SACR 410 (W) and S v Daba 1996 (1) SACR 243 (E).
INTERCEPTION AND MONITORING
See unconstitutionally obtained evidence below.
ONUS
Section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a
peace officer may lawfully arrest a person without a warrant if he or
she has a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has committed an
offence referred to in Schedule 1. As noted by Harms DP in Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 (1) SACR 315 (SCA), ‘[i]t is
trite that the onus rests on the defendant to justify an arrest’ (para
[7]). However, the issue of the onus nevertheless arose due to the
introduction of what Harms DP terms a fifth jurisdictional fact by
Bertelsmann J in Louw v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (2)
SACR 178 (T) — that arrest without a warrant must also be
constitutionally justifiable. This requirement, according to the court
in Louw, requires the arrestor to consider whether there is a less
invasive manner in which to bring the suspect before a court (at
187f) (see also Ralekwa v Minister of Safety and Security 2004 (1)
SACR 131 (T); Gellman v Minister of Safety and Security 2008
(1) SACR 446 (W); Le Roux v Minister of Safety and Security 2009
(2) SACR 252 (KZP); Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security
2009 (1) SACR 211 (E); Mvu v Minister of Safety and Security 2009
(2) SACR 292 (GSJ)).
After a careful consideration of the constitutional directive in
section 39(2) to interpret legislation in a manner that promotes
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, Harms DP
concluded that a number of High Courts had erred in following
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Louw by reading into section 40(1)(b) this fifth jurisdictional fact.
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that, absent a finding of
unconstitutionality, the courts ‘were not entitled to read anything
into’ the clear text of section 40(1)(b); furthermore, that an arrest
in terms of section 40(1)(b) could not be said to be arbitrary or
without just cause; consequently, there appeared to be no
ground for a constitutional challenge (para [25]). The court,
making a careful distinction between jurisdictional fact and
discretion, noted that a peace officer was not obliged to effect an
arrest when the circumstances set out in section 40(1)(b) arose;
he or she had a discretion whether or not to do so. This discretion,
the court (referring to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC)) held, is required to be exercised in a
manner that is objectively rational. The court found that in the
circumstances of the particular case (and noting the seriousness
of the offence) the peace officer had exercised his discretion
rationally.
The court, obiter, then went on to consider the appropriate
allocation of the onus in respect of establishing the rational exercise
of a peace officer’s discretion. Harms DP applied past precedent
and held that this was an instant where the pleadings might give rise
to two separate burdens. Once the arrestor has established the
jurisdictional facts justifying an arrest in terms of section 40(1)(b),
the party alleging an irrational exercise of an arrestor’s section
40(1)(b) discretion bears the onus of establishing the absence of
rationality. Taking into account that a party alleging an infringement
of a right in the Bill of Right bears the burden of proving such
infringement, the court held that the common law in requiring the
arrestee to prove irrationality on the part of the arrestor was not
inconsistent with the Constitution. The court, noting that a person
challenging a parole decision or the refusal of presidential pardon
bore the burden of proof, concluded that it was irrelevant whether it
was the right to freedom which was at stake. However, these two
examples can also be distinguished from arrest without a warrant as
a person seeking parole or a presidential pardon has already been
deprived of his or her freedom by a court after guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt has been established.
The court also held that as the onus was allocated in the
context of civil proceedings, consideration ‘of policy, practice
and fairness’ dictated that the arrestee bear the burden of
proving rationality, and this was an additional indicator of consti-
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tutionality. (Harms DP also refers to ‘sensibility’ which he
strangely juxtaposes with trial fairness — perhaps the strange-
ness lies in my lack of imagination.) It would be impractical and
unfair to expect an arrestor to negate all possible grounds
for unreasonableness without them having being specifically
pleaded by the claimant. However, it is unclear why this could not
be discharged by an evidentiary burden, which, unlike the true
onus, can shift between the parties. The imposition of an eviden-
tiary burden on the arrestee would seem to align with the dictates
of a policy shaped by the constitutional directive to promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
See sexual offences below.
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
In S v Tshabalala 2011 (1) SACR 497 (GNP), Mavundla J held
that a court is obliged to inform an accused who has pleaded
guilty in terms of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act of his
or her right to remain silent. The court also held that the failure to
do so will not necessarily result in an infringement of the right to a
fair trial. This qualification is consistent with the holding of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in DPP, Natal v Magidela 2000 (1)
SACR 459 (SCA). However, the categorical assertion that the
court bears a constitutional duty to advise an accused who has
pleaded guilty of the right to remain silent is not. The Supreme
Court of Appeal, in Magidela, left this question open. High Courts
have been divided on this issue (for example, S v Maseko 1996
(2) SACR 91 (W); S v Damons 1997 (2) SACR 218 (W)). Perhaps it
really does not matter as it is hard to imagine circumstances in
which an accused who has pleaded guilty can be prejudiced by
answering questions. The reasoning in Tshabalala would have
been more convincing if the court could have given a concrete
example of how an accused who has pleaded guilty can compro-
mise him- or herself further by answering questions.
Questioning in terms of section 112 is aimed at protecting the
accused (S v Williams 2008 (1) SACR 65 (C)), and it would prima
facie appear to be against the interest of the accused in those
circumstances to suggest he or she remain silent. The right to
remain silent is necessary to protect the accused in his or her
contest against the State, but once he or she has pleaded guilty,
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there is no longer a contest between the state and the accused,
as the accused has clearly abdicated his or her right to be
presumed innocent.
SEXUAL OFFENCES
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 came into effect on the 16 December
2007. The relevant provisions of the Act read as follows:
‘58 Evidence relating to previous consistent statements by a com-
plainant shall be admissible in criminal proceedings involving the
alleged commission of a sexual offence: Provided that the court may
not draw any inference only from the absence of such previous
statements.
‘59 In criminal proceedings involving the alleged commission of a
sexual offence, the court may not draw any inference only from the
length of any delay between the alleged commission of such offence
and the reporting thereof.’
In S v Leve 2011 (1) SACR 87 (ECG), Jones J (Liebenberg and
Van Zyl JJ concurring) observed that the child’s timeous reporting
of the sexual assault was ‘relevant to the credibility of a complain-
ant because failure to complain can give rise to criticism that he
did not behave as would be expected of a child in the circum-
stances’. This would seem to be in direct conflict with section 59,
which expressly prohibits the drawing of such an inference; one
can only hope that this was an error and not an extension of the
questionable cautionary rule applicable to children in order to
circumvent section 59.
SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE
In S v Nduna 2011 (1) SACR 115 (SCA), the Supreme Court of
Appeal narrowly avoided the dangers of categorization and
stressed relevance as the foundation for the admission of similar
fact evidence. It admitted the evidence on the basis that match-
ing fingerprints found on two vehicles involved in similar style
robberies could not be explained away on the basis of coinci-
dence.
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
In S v Cwele 2011 (1) SACR 409 (KZP), Koen J, having held
that the provisions of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition
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Act 127 of 1992 (the Act was repealed by the Regulation of
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communica-
tion-related Information Act 70 of 2002) could be interpreted
so as to accommodate cellphone communications, considered
(a) whether the interception was lawful; and (b) whether the
evidence obtained as a result of the interception was admissible.
The application for a direction allowing interception and moni-
toring in terms of the 1992 Act referred to accused No 2 and two
others but made no reference to accused No 1. Counsel for
accused No 1 argued that the communications with a third party
and those named in the direction were inadmissible against the
third party (accused No 1). This argument was rejected by the
court on the basis that it would be self-defeating and nonsensical
to exclude evidence the obtaining of which underlay the applica-
tion for the direction in the first place — to identify people to
whom drugs were being supplied.
The accuseds’ final argument in their desperate attempt to get the
evidence of the intercepted cellphone conversations excluded was
based on an assertion that even if the evidence had been lawfully
obtained, admitting it would infringe the accuseds’ right to privacy
and dignity. It does not seem that the constitutionality of the 1992Act
was challenged but merely the admissibility of the evidence. Koen J
correctly concluded that ‘[i]n the absence of an attack on the
constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Act, it would be
incongruous to find that evidence, lawfully obtained and permitted
in terms of the Act, was to be excluded on some other basis’ (para
[26]). The court noted (para [7]) that evidence obtained through
unauthorized interception and monitoring would ordinarily be
excluded.
In S v Mkhize 2011 (1) SACR 554 (KZD), the court held that a
confession obtained in light of a constitutional breach should be




Section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that all
persons not expressly excluded by the Act or the common law as
it stood on the 30 May 1961 are competent witnesses. It is the
duty of the court to determine the competence of a witness and a
party may not consent to the admission of the evidence of an
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incompetent witness (S v Thurston 1968 (3) SA 284 (A) at 291). In
terms of section 194 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a person who
is mentally ill and ‘thereby deprived of the proper use of his
reason’ may not give evidence while the disability persists. It
appears clear from the construction of the section that it is the
inability to properly reason that is the disqualifying factor and not
the medical diagnosis.
A court may elect to hold a trial-within-a-trial to determine
competence, or it may reach its conclusions on the basis of its
own observations of the witness (see S v Zenzile 1992 (1) SACR
444 (C)). In S v Dladla 2011 (1) SACR 80 (KZP), the court was
required to determine whether the magistrate in the court a quo
had correctly found the complainant to be a competent witness.
The complainant was a patient in a mental institution who alleged
that he had been assaulted by two night nurses. The appeal
court in setting aside the convictions on the basis that the
magistrate had failed to hold a proper inquiry into the compe-
tence of the accused did not note important distinguishing
features of the cases relied upon. For example, S v Mahlinza
1967 (1) SA 408 (A), which calls for psychiatric evidence to be
led, dealt with a finding on criminal capacity and not the
testimonial competence of a witness; S v Katoo 2005 (1) SACR
522 (SCA) was a case in which a finding of incompetence was
overturned with particular reference to the presumption of com-
petence referred to in section 192. One wonders whether, if the
court had taken these distinctions into account, it might have
reached a different conclusion. What is clear from Katoo is that
the essential inquiry is whether the witness can communicate
with the court in a reasoned manner. Who better to make this
assessment than the court who can then determine what weight
it might wish to attach to the evidence in making its final decision?
The decision in Dladla increases the vulnerability of a much
marginalized sector of society.
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